

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 00514 150120Z

70

ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-11 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 SAM-01 DRC-01

ACDA-19 /186 W

----- 033373

R 142350Z FEB 74

FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2723

INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 514

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNSC IR IZ

SUBJ: IRAQI REQUEST FOR SC MEETING

1. ACCCOMPANIED BY AMB SCHAUFELE AND POLCOUNS, I SAT DOWN THIS AFTERNOON WITH IRAQI ACTING PERMREP TALIB EL-SHIBIB TO DISCUSS IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE. EL-SHIBIB HAD ARRIVED FROM BAGHDAD ONLY A FEW HOURS EARLIER.

2. USING BEST ARAB RHETORIC AND GIVING FULL HISTORIC BACKGROUND, SHIBIB DREW PICTURE OF LONG-TIME RESTRAINT IN FACE OF IRANIAN BAD FAITH AND ENCROACHMENTS ON ARAB TERRITORY. UP TO SIX IRANIAN DIVISIONS NOW MASSED ON IRAQI BORDER, PLUS AIRCRAFT WHICH CONSTANTLY OVERFLYING IRAQ. IRAQ HAD SUFFERED 100 CASUALTIES, AND HAD COMPLETELY LOST FAITH IN POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS WITH IRAN AND IN UTILITY OF QUIET DIPLOMACY. AS IT NOW CLEAR THAT "IT NEEDS BUT LITTLE TO START GENERAL CONFLAGRATION," IRAQIS HAD TAKEN FIRM DECISION TO BRING MATTER FORMALLY BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WORLD OPINION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 00514 150120Z

INTERESTINGLY, SHIBIB ASSERTED THAT IRAQIS HAD FIRED FIRST

SHOT IN RESPONSE TO IRANIAN ASSUMPTION OF POSITIONS WITHIN
IRAQI TERRITORY.

3. SHIBIB SAID IRAQ DID NOT WANT SC TO PASS JUDGMENT OR
ASSIGN GUILT. RATHER, HE WANTED SC AS MINIMUM TO DEMAND
(A) WITHDRAWAL OF IRANIAN TROOPS TO THEIR OWN TERRITORY,
(B) RESPECT BY BOTH PARTIES FOR EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY,
(C) MUTUAL RESTRAINT INCLUDING REDUCTION OF FORCES
MOBILIZED ON BORDER AREA, AND (D) DISPATCH OF A
"COMMISSION" REPRESENTING EITHER SYG OR SC TO LOOK INTO
CAUSES OF PRESENT TENSIONS. LATER IN CONVERSATION HE
PROMISED UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO ALL TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY
IRAQ, BUT WAFFLED WHEN I ASKED WHETHER IRAQ WOULD BIND ITSELF
TO ACCEPT FINDINGS OF SUCH A COMMISSION.

4. SHIBIB ASSERTED IRAQ HAD CONFIDENCE IN SC AND MADE
RITUAL ASSERTION THAT US HAD SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO
RESOLVE SITUATION BECAUSE WE HAD HEAVILY ARMED IRAN.
I TOLD HIM THAT AMERICANS GET A BIT IRRITATED WITH ASSERTIONS
OF "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY" AND SAID THAT IRANIAN POLICY
NO MORE CONTROLLED BY AMERICANS THAN IRAQI POLICY BY USSR,
WHICH PROVIDES ARMS TO IRAQ. I THEN ASKED SHIBIB VERY PRECISELY
WHETHER HE REGARDED SITUATION AS MORE
DANGEROUS THAN PREVIOUS HOT PERIODS IN IRAQ-IRAN RELATIONS.
I SAID WE HAD HOPED THAT FACT SHAH RECEIVING NEW IRAQI
AMBASSADOR FEB 16 OFFERED POSSIBILITY THAT PROBLEM COULD BE
RESOLVED BILATERALLY. DID SHIBIB NOT THINK IT PREMATURE
FOR SC TO INTERVENE BEFORE THIS BILATERAL CONTACT
GIVEN A CHANCE? I WENT ON TO SAY THAT US HAS TRIED TO PLAY
AND HAS IN FACT BEEN PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE
AREA. US IS INTERESTED IN PERMANENT PEACE, IN ENDING
TENSIONS, NOT JUST EASING THEM. FROM THIS POINT OF DEPARTURE
US HAD REACHED CONCLUSION THAT PUBLIC CONFRONTATION, AS
IN OPEN MEETING OF SC, WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS AND MIGHT
SEND SHOCK WAVES THAT WOULD BE FELT FAR FROM IRAN-IRAQ
BORDER. I REPEATEDLY URGED SHIBIB TO CONSIDER UTILITY OF
CONTINUING PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS RATHER THAN PRESSING
ON TO OPEN SESSION OF SC. I ASSERTED THAT US HAD NO
PARTISAN INTEREST IN DISPUTE. I FELT US WOULD BE WILLING
TO LEND ITS GOOD OFFICES IN SOME WAY IN CONTEXT OF QUIET
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 00514 150120Z

DIPLOMACY TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT RESOLUTION OF DIFFICULTY.
I EMPHASIZED IRAQI TIMING WAS BAD BOTH TACTICALLY AND
AGAINST LARGER BACK-DROP OF ON-GOING EFFORTS TO DEAL
WITH FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF MIDDLE EAST. I URGED SHIBIB
TO CONSULT HIS BEST FRIENDS AS TO DESIRABILITY OF GOING
THE PUBLIC ROUTE AND PREDICTED HE WOULD NOWHERE FIND ANY
ENTHUSIASM FOR RECORD MEETING OF SC.

5. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN CONVERSATION, I SLIPPED I REMARKS WHICH TENDED TO REMIND SHIBIB THAT IRAQ COULD NOT "WIN" A SHOUTING MATCH WITH IRAN IN SC. SPECIFICALLY, I TOLD HIM I HAD HEARD IRANIAN SIDE OF STORY AND THAT IRAQ SHOULD NOT BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION IT WOULD WIN PROPAGANDA CONTEST.

6. SHIBIB IS STURDY AND EFFECTIVE DEBATER AND DID NOT GIVE GROUND. HE DID UNDERTAKE TO REPORT MY REPRESENTATIONS TO BAGHDAD. HE DID NOT QUESTION MY GOOD FAITH OR THAT OF USG. HE MADE A NUMBER OF REJOINDERS. HE REITERATED THAT IRAQ HAS NO FAITH IN BILATERAL ROUTE AND (PERHAPS IN MORE TENTATIVE TONE OF VOICE) NO FAITH IN OFF-THE-RECORD DIPLOMACY. HE REITERATED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING SC TO REACH JUDGMENT. IN ONE BREATH HE REITERATED CONFIDENCE IN SC'S CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM, AND IN ANOTHER HE SAID THAT IF SC FAILS TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO IRAQI REQUEST, IRAQ WOULD AT VERY LEAST HAVE ESTABLISHED IN PUBLIC VIEW A FEW CLEAR BENCH-MARKS. AMONG SIDELIGHTS OF HIS REPRESENTATIONS WAS ASSERTION THAT* BAGHDAD DID NOT EXPECT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ITS CASE. "USSR IS AS CLOSE TO IRAN AS IRAQ." HE ALSO ARGUED THAT IRAQ HAD UP TO NOW AVOIDED SHIPPING UP DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION. HE ALLEGED THAT IRAN HAD PROVED THAT IT WAS THE PARTY PLAYING AGGRESSIVE GAMES BY ENFLAMING UP DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION (E.G., WITH GAUDY FUNERALS FOR ITS SOLDIERS LOST IN BORDER FIGHTING).

7. COMMENT: SHIBIB TRIED HARD TO CONVEY IMPRESSION THAT IRAQIS DEEPLY PROVOKED BY IRANIAN ACTION AND BY CONCERN LEST FLAMMABLE BORDER SITUATION RESULT IN GENERAL WAR WHICH IRAQ WOULD LOSE. IMPLICATION APPEARED TO BE THAT THIS CONCERN OUTWEIGHED ALL OTHER IRAQI INTERESTS IN ME. WE MUST WAIT AND SEE WHETHER MY ARGUMENTS HAD SUFFICIENT IMPACT ON HIS THINKING TO PAVE WAY FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 00514 150120Z

RETREAT FROM INSISTENCE ON PUBLIC MEETING AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER ARAB REPRESENTATIVES AND SPECIAL FRIENDS.

SCALI

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TROOP DEPLOYMENT, SOVEREIGNTY, MEETINGS, BOUNDARY CLAIMS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, LIMITATION OF HOSTILITIES, POLITICAL SITUATION, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, UNGA RESOLUTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974USUNN00514
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740231/aaaabcd.tel
Line Count: 157
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <14 JAN 2003 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IRAQI REQUEST FOR SC MEETING
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IR, IZ, UNSC
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005